For better or worse, no country’s foreign relations dictate the course of world politics more than the United States, so it is worth paying attention to who the country chooses to associate with and who it keeps at a distance.
A place to start is the “Major Non-NATO Allies” (MNNA). This is not some arbitrary status made up by the State Department or White House. The designation was in fact created by an act of Congress in 1989 and it gives the President the power to designate any country he chooses as a MNNA[i]. The term allows countires that the President designates as MNNA’s access to a variety of significant financial and defense benefits like access to Defense Department research and development, assistance in counterterrorism, and military training. The US is prohibited by law to provide these kinds of benefits to countries that are not in NATO or not designated as MNNA’s[ii].
Examining the list of countries that have received the designation since its inception reveals some interesting aspects of American foreign policy. President George HW Bush, the first president with the power to make the designation designated Australia, Israel, Egypt, South Korea, and Japan. None of these are particularly surprising as all these countries have been steady US allies for the second half of the twentieth century. It is interesting to note that the US made the effort to include Egypt among such favored allies as Japan and Israel. This was no doubt, in part, a measure to reward Egypt for its leadership among Arab nations in the peace process with Israel in the earlier decade[iii].
Bill Clinton also designated three relatively uncontroversial countries: Jordan, New Zealand, and Argentina in 1996, 1997, and 1998 respectively. Once again, it should come as no surprise that Jordan had signed a landmark peace treaty with Israel, the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty, at the end of 1994[iv]. With that treaty, Jordan was only the second Arab country to normalize relations with Israel, the other being….Egypt.
The designations made by President Bush, all made after the events of 9/11, indicate a shift in US diplomatic thinking. Four of Bush’s six designations were majority-Muslim countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Morocco, and Pakistan). The first, the Bahrain was given the designation in 2002. Bahrain is, in the aftermath of 9/11, what the US wished Saudi Arabia could be. It was a kingdom propped up by oil (60% of government revenue is from oil)[v], but beginning in 1999, its King instituted parliamentary elections with universal suffrage, released political prisoners, and began various social reforms.
Thailand and the Philippines were both recognized by Bush as MNNA’s in 2004. These two are fairly similar instances and both clear cases of balancing on the part of the US in South East Asia. Both Thailand and the Philippines have been steady allies of the US since World War II and were charter members of the South East Asia Treaty Organization, a collective defense organization established in 1954, designed to be a counterpart of NATO in South East Asia. Both countries sent troops to Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom, which commenced in 2003 (a rarity among Asian countries). Also, 2004 marked the beginning of the Bush’s administration’s escalating tensions with China. The strong, symbolic message sent by designating Thailand and the Philippines as MNNAs communicated to China that the US continued to remain a presence in South East Asia (China’s backyard) and that it would continue to invest in friends there.
The most controversial of Bush’s designation was that of Pakistan. Unlike the other instances examined, this designation was far more pragmatic in nature than a symbol of a strong relationship[vi]. The designation was primarily designed to shore up the weak and (barely) democratic government of Pervez Musharaff, to allow the US intelligence and defense community to aid Pakistan’s forces in fighting al-Qaeda and securing Pakistan’s nukes (both vital to American security interests)
Examining the history reveals three general instances the Presidents have used the MNNA power for: to reward loyal allies with defense and financial benefits (Japan, New Zealand), to reward countries that have acted in accordance with US interests and set a “good example” for their neighbors (Jordan, Egypt), and to reassert US interests in a contested region (Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines). The MNNA designation has essentially become a tool in American diplomatic thinking that accomplishes much more than just strengthening bilateral ties, and will most likely continue to be used by future presidents to achieve broad strategic goals.
[i] US Code, Title 22, §2321
[ii] US Code, Title 10, §2350
[iii] Fisher, Dan. “U.S. Is Granting Israel Non-NATO Ally Status; Egypt Gets Same Rating” 16 February 1989. Los Angeles Times. http://articles.latimes.com/1989-02-16/news/mn-2391_1_egypt-non-nato-ally
[iv] Prados, Aflred. “Issue Brief for Congress: Jordan and the United States Bilateral Issues”. 14 March 2006. Congressional Research Service. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/ awcgate/crs/ib93085.pdf
[v] “Trade Policy Review”. World Trade Organization. 13 June 2007.
[vi] Rhode, David. “US Will Celebrate Pakistan as a Major Non-NATO Ally”. 19 March 2004. New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/19/world/us-will-celebrate-pakistan-as-a-major-non-nato-ally.html
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