The Evolution of Terror

In the wake of the recent commemoration of the anniversary of 9/11, people of all races, ages, and religions reflected upon the impact that such a terrifying and interminable couple of hours on that fateful September morning had not on only on their lives but on the lives of the people around the world. Citizens of over 90 different countries perished in the attacks on the World Trade Center[1], and in one voice of global solidarity and unity, protests against the violence and memorials for those who had died took place from Madrid to Tehran to Islamabad and elsewhere across the Arab and non-Arab world alike. The global solidarity resulted from the backlash against the blatant violence and extremism of the attacks. With these assaults on the global financial and military centers (and the failed assault on the world’s political foci), an evolution in international terrorism and the changes that have taken place within these cultures of violence and radicalism can be observed from comparison with another fateful terrorist attack that took place this very month 31 years ago.

The Black September movement surely changed the course of history in the Middle East, and the ways in which political and social legitimacy was sought for many transnational movements and national liberation fronts. “Within the space of two hours on September 6, PFLP gangs hijacked a TWA jet, a Swissair jet, and made an unsuccessful attempt to seize control of an El Al airplane. About two hours later, another PFLP group hijacked a Pan Am jet and forced the crew to fly to Beirut airport, where the airplane landed almost out of fuel”.[2] In total, 5 airplanes carrying mostly westerners were hijacked and flown to a remote airstrip in the middle of the Jordanian desert. By no means was this the advent of international terrorism; this was the 12^th such hijacking since 1968 alone; however, “unlike previous ones,…this hijacking was a bold political statement. The terrorists who seized the El Al flight had done so with the express purpose of trading passengers they held hostage for Palestinian terrorists imprisoned in Israel.”[3] And they wanted the whole world to see it. They expressly demanded that reporters and photographers be there on sight to capture their moment.

What followed that afternoon was a combination of fearful intimidation and peaceful coexistence as reporters, the flight crew, the victims, and armed hijackers strolled around the Jordanian desert until the crisis had been resolved. It is interesting to note how in 1970, the terrorists sought to use airplanes as a tool to achieve a political end of a group who had felt themselves marginalize in the appendix of history, for many westerners knew very little or nothing of the plight of the Palestinians; whereas at the turn of the 21^st century, terrorists began to weaponize airplanes and use them not as strategic tools but as missiles to bring the greatest power on earth to its knees, if only for a single day. The Palestinians, “through the combination of dramatic political statement, ‘symbolic’ targeting, and crisis induced de-facto recognition,”[4] realized that they were able to create a major media event—especially one when innocent civilians were involved. And they would use this tactic two years later to address their grievances again, except this time the whole world would be watching.

Because of the rampant success of the September 7^th hijackings, the PLO recognized the value in creating terror and how to capture the world’s attention. They sought to do just that when on September 5^th, 1972, 11 Israeli athletes attending the Olympics in Munich were taken hostage and ultimately executed. While the whole world was watching their televisions expecting to see honest competition and nationalism at its fullest, instead every global media outlet was concentrating on the events unfolding between two ethnic nationalities that fought in a very small corner of the globe but had globalized their conflict so that the whole world would notice. It may not be coincidental then that 18 months after Munich, Yasser Arafat, the leader of the PLO, was invited to address the UN General Assembly, Palestine was given official observer status in the UN, and by the end of the 1970s, the PLO, a non-state actor, had more formal diplomatic relations with other counties (eighty-six) than did the established nation-state of Israel (seventy-two).[5]

So how has terrorism evolved? Well for one, it has transformed from being purely political means to an end to becoming an ideological phenomenon. The internationalization of terrorism started in the 1970s, and since then, hundreds of individual groups and actors have sought to redress their grievances, seek justice, wreck havoc, and most fundamentally cause terror. The weaponization of transportation has been a recent development that terrorists have sought to use in order to generate more terror. Such a psychological and sociological shift in the minds of the people who are committing these acts is apparent in their abject social responsibility. The terrorist attacks of the past decade from Madrid, to London, to New York all have resonated deeply and affected the civil societies of the respective countries and will fundamentally alter the way nation-states view the international community at large and the way in which they conduct anti-terror operations to make this world a safer place.

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[1] Walker, Carolee. “Five Year Rememberance Honors Victims from 90 Countries.” America.gov. 15 Sept 2010.

[2] Armed Conflict Events Database. “Black September in Jordan 1970-1971.” 15 Sept 2010

[3] Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism Columbia. New York. 2006

[4] McGuinn, Bradford. International Terrorism. University of Miami. 13 Sept 2010

[5] Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. Pg. 70. Columbia. New York. 2006

You Are Who Your Friends Are

For better or worse, no country’s foreign relations dictate the course of world politics more than the United States, so it is worth paying attention to who the country chooses to associate with and who it keeps at a distance.

A place to start is the “Major Non-NATO Allies” (MNNA). This is not some arbitrary status made up by the State Department or White House. The designation was in fact created by an act of Congress in 1989 and it gives the President the power to designate any country he chooses as a MNNA[i]. The term allows countires that the President designates as MNNA’s access to a variety of significant financial and defense benefits like access to Defense Department research and development, assistance in counterterrorism, and military training. The US is prohibited by law to provide these kinds of benefits to countries that are not in NATO or not designated as MNNA’s[ii].

Examining the list of countries that have received the designation since its inception reveals some interesting aspects of American foreign policy. President George HW Bush, the first president with the power to make the designation designated Australia, Israel, Egypt, South Korea, and Japan. None of these are particularly surprising as all these countries have been steady US allies for the second half of the twentieth century. It is interesting to note that the US made the effort to include Egypt among such favored allies as Japan and Israel. This was no doubt, in part, a measure to reward Egypt for its leadership among Arab nations in the peace process with Israel in the earlier decade[iii].

Bill Clinton also designated three relatively uncontroversial countries: Jordan, New Zealand, and Argentina in 1996, 1997, and 1998 respectively. Once again, it should come as no surprise that Jordan had signed a landmark peace treaty with Israel, the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty, at the end of 1994[iv]. With that treaty, Jordan was only the second Arab country to normalize relations with Israel, the other being….Egypt.

The designations made by President Bush, all made after the events of 9/11, indicate a shift in US diplomatic thinking. Four of Bush’s six designations were majority-Muslim countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Morocco, and Pakistan). The first, the Bahrain was given the designation in 2002. Bahrain is, in the aftermath of 9/11, what the US wished Saudi Arabia could be. It was a kingdom propped up by oil (60% of government revenue is from oil)[v], but beginning in 1999, its King instituted parliamentary elections with universal suffrage, released political prisoners, and began various social reforms.

Thailand and the Philippines were both recognized by Bush as MNNA’s in 2004. These two are fairly similar instances and both clear cases of balancing on the part of the US in South East Asia. Both Thailand and the Philippines have been steady allies of the US since World War II and were charter members of the South East Asia Treaty Organization, a collective defense organization established in 1954, designed to be a counterpart of NATO in South East Asia. Both countries sent troops to Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom, which commenced in 2003 (a rarity among Asian countries). Also, 2004 marked the beginning of the Bush’s administration’s escalating tensions with China. The strong, symbolic message sent by designating Thailand and the Philippines as MNNAs communicated to China that the US continued to remain a presence in South East Asia (China’s backyard) and that it would continue to invest in friends there.

The most controversial of Bush’s designation was that of Pakistan. Unlike the other instances examined, this designation was far more pragmatic in nature than a symbol of a strong relationship[vi]. The designation was primarily designed to shore up the weak and (barely) democratic government of Pervez Musharaff, to allow the US intelligence and defense community to aid Pakistan’s forces in fighting al-Qaeda and securing Pakistan’s nukes (both vital to American security interests)

Examining the history reveals three general instances the Presidents have used the MNNA power for: to reward loyal allies with defense and financial benefits (Japan, New Zealand), to reward countries that have acted in accordance with US interests and set a “good example” for their neighbors (Jordan, Egypt), and to reassert US interests in a contested region (Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines). The MNNA designation has essentially become a tool in American diplomatic thinking that accomplishes much more than just strengthening bilateral ties, and will most likely continue to be used by future presidents to achieve broad strategic goals.

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[i] US Code, Title 22, §2321

[ii] US Code, Title 10, §2350

[iii] Fisher, Dan. “U.S. Is Granting Israel Non-NATO Ally Status; Egypt Gets Same Rating” 16 February 1989. Los Angeles Times. http://articles.latimes.com/1989-02-16/news/mn-2391_1_egypt-non-nato-ally

[iv] Prados, Aflred. “Issue Brief for Congress: Jordan and the United States Bilateral Issues”. 14 March 2006. Congressional Research Service. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/ awcgate/crs/ib93085.pdf

[v] “Trade Policy Review”. World Trade Organization. 13 June 2007.

[vi] Rhode, David. “US Will Celebrate Pakistan as a Major Non-NATO Ally”. 19 March 2004. New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/19/world/us-will-celebrate-pakistan-as-a-major-non-nato-ally.html

What Do Pakistanis Think About America?

Pakistan is the U.S. key ally in the struggle to route Afghanistan-based Taliban and al-Qaeda extremists. As U.S. special envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke puts it, “there’s a direct correlation between Afghanistan, Pakistan and our [U.S.] homeland security” (Gaouette). During the last official visit to Pakistan this July, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton acknowledged the “legacy of suspicion” among Pakistanis towards the United States and reinforced the U.S. commitment “for the long haul” to work with Pakistanis (Gaouette).

Indeed, in order to assure a fruitful partnership with Pakistan, the United States needs not only to provide it with monetary and humanitarian help, but most importantly win the hearts and minds of the Pakistanis themselves. All this time, the Obama administration has been focused on negotiations with Pakistani state officials, forgetting about the general population. As the result, only “11 percent of Pakistanis see the U.S. as a partner and just 8 percent have confidence that President Barack Obama will make good decisions on global affairs,” according to a recent Pew survey done in Pakistan (Gaouette).

CNN reporter Kaj Larsen also gathered some interesting data on Pakistanis' views of Americans and America, while he was crisscrossing Pakistan covering the aftermath of the devastating earthquake. In Multan, a city in the Punjab Province, Larsen interviewed two cooks who both hold a very positive view about Americans. One of them said that America was not Pakistan’s enemy, because Americans were helping Pakistani people. Stopping for some chai tea, Larsen got to interview a group of people who all agreed that America was a good country. A cashier on a petrol station thought the United States was helping people who were affected by the floods. However, the man standing next to him thought America was attacking one Muslim country after another and he was concerned that the U.S. will attack Pakistan next. The manager of the guest house where Larsen was staying with his team said that Pakistanis give maximum regard to America in Pakistan, but Pakistanis were not treated well in the U.S. A female doctor, speaking English, believed that in times of disaster the U.S. gives Pakistan lots of food. At the same time it is “throwing bombs” on Pakistan. She said that if the United States wanted to win the hearts of the people, then it needs “to live in the hearts of the people.”

So, a well-educated doctor is concerned about U.S. policies and a chai tea-maker holds a positive view about America. These mixed and controversial views should be a danger signal for the Obama administration. The overall success of the U.S. struggle to route Taliban and al-Qaeda depends on how well the U.S. will do in Pakistan. And this in its turn depends on the relationship the U.S. will cultivate with the Pakistani population. In other words, vox populi will decide!



Works cited

Gaouette, Nicole. “Most Pakistanis View U.S. as Enemy, Want War Over, Survey Finds.” Bloomberg Businessweek. July 19, 2010. Sept. 16, 2010 .

“What Do Pakistanis Think of the U.S.” Besternews.com. Sept. 13, 2010 .

Model United Nations: The best kept secret among UM’s extracurriculars

“Where do you start saving the world?” This bold question is what members of the UM MUN competitive team ask themselves with each endeavor they pursue. The students that join Model UN are looking for an organization where they can grow both professionally and personally, and Model UN assuredly can provide this and much more.

Currently comprised of 14 members, the team represents a snapshot of the university community with students from diverse majors and interests, and has set a precedent for diversity and excellence since its inception in 2002. This organization has been a stellar component to the University of Miami’s extracurricular opportunities, flourishing in the past 7 years receiving the top honor of Outstanding Delegation at the National Model United Nations Conference in New York for 5 consecutive years, and then expanding to successfully compete, and bring home awards, from Harvard University, McGill University, Georgetown University and the University of Chicago in the last 2 years.

The team not only participates in competitive conferences, they also staff local, statewide and national high school conferences as a way to give back to MUN programs directly geared towards inner city teens with little access to academic extracurriculars. Among some of their other pursuits, the MUN team creates a culture of excellence, with its’ members always willing to be active volunteers and participants in campus wide initiatives such as the Global Business Forum, the Clinton Global Initiative Foundation, COISO’s annual UN Day, the Student Government Senate and the Resident Assistant program, among others.

This year, the Model UN team is looking to expand and take on new feats. They plan to attend more conferences this year, including proving their talent at the University of Pennsylvania for the first time.

If you’re interested in sharpening your speaking and debate skills and solving some of the world’s most pressing issues, while building a network of highly motivated and successful peers, this organization may be exactly what you have been looking for. The team is currently holding info sessions regarding MUN in general as well as the 3 step try-out process for joining the team. The try out process culminates with Canes Conference, a 1 day, on campus mini MUN simulation where any undergraduate student can participate, even if they have no prior MUN experience. This conference will be held on Sunday September 26th.

If you would like more information regarding the info sessions, the team, or Canes Conference, please email the MUN team directly at umiamimun@gmail.com.

Humanitarian Relief a Necessity for Pakistan

In the ultra-connected world in which we live, we have developed a sort of solemn, yet dutiful ritual when a natural disaster strikes, especially in Third World or underdeveloped countries. Pictures of orphaned children and tent hospitals appear on CNN. The President, whoever he might be, releases a statement promising support from the United States and its citizens and other developed countries do the same. The UN begins to arrive in the affected area. George Clooney hosts a telethon and asks us to text $10 to the Red Cross. Developed countries are increasing coordination bilaterally and via the United Nations making humanitarian responses more robust and organized.

This all makes what’s happening in Pakistan noteworthy. Following heavy monsoon rains during this summer, flooding began in northeast Pakistan at the beginning of August. The statistics are mind-numbing. A full month after the flooding began, one fifth of the country is still underwater. The United Nations estimates that 20 million people have been left homeless, seriously injured, or both. Officials put the total economic damage to the country at 43 billion US dollars. However, at almost one month after the flooding began, the international relief effort is conspicuously lacking in both enthusiasm and scope.

Within the first ten days of the flooding, $45 million had been donated to Pakistan. In comparison, in the first ten days after the Haitian earthquake $742 million had been committed. Pakistani earthquake’s in 2005 yielded $247 million during the first ten day’s of its aftermath. During the first ten days following cyclones in Myanmar in 2008, $110 million was pledged by the international community. All the these crises affected far less people than the current floods in Pakistan and the economic and structural devastation was far less severe.

The aid response has simply fallen short of what is needed. Halfway through August, the United Nations released an appeal to the international community asking for at least $460 million more dollars. This was just to simply cover the immediate needs of the victims over the next few weeks and months, not any long term rebuilding efforts. Representatives of UNICEF have stated that they are unable to reach many victims who lack clean water due to a “serious lack of funds”.The World Health Organization faces similar funding problems. State Department Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, publicly stated, “The international recognition of this disaster has not yet been sufficient to its dimensions”.

Various theories as to why the response has been so inert have been presented. Some cite a lack of celebrity involvement and media coverage.Some say the death toll, being so much lower than the disasters in Haiti and the Indian Ocean, has failed to catch public attention. Some have cited the phenomenon known as “disaster fatigue”, where citizens of countries like the US simply lose enthusiasm after successive disasters at home and abroad. And their is the fact that Western governments fear their aid is either going to a corrupt Pakistani government or worse, funding Islamic terrorism in the region. UK’s Prime Minister David Cameron just last month accused Pakistan of “promoting the export of terror” to both India and Afghanistan.

Whatever the reason, the lack of aid is documented, and it is having a direct impact on the ability of relief efforts to reach those affected and to rebuild Pakistan. This is a tragic humanitarian situation, as the 20 million people affected will continue to languish as they wait for any form of aid to arrive. The fact that Pakistan happens to be a country with a formidable nuclear arsenal, an unstable civilian government, and a military and intelligence community that is controlled by radical Islamist elements makes the lacking response even more pressing. It is not hyperbole to say that these floods have put the Pakistani economy on the verge of collapse. The Taliban in Pakistan has already begun a concerted effort to aid victims, no doubt with the end goal of winning more hearts and minds. And the civilian government of President Asif Ali Zardari cannot survive much more public scorn if it hopes to remain in power.

From the perspective of the United States, there are few countries in the world whose well-being matters more than Pakistan’s. Like it or not, our security depends on what happens there. If anyone wants to think of themselves as serious about Islamic terrorism or nuclear proliferation, they first need to get serious about humanitarian relief.

Why Eight Tourists Should Not Have Died - Manila Bus Hostage Crisis

For nearly twelve long hours, the scenes of a standoff between a tour bus hijacker and policemen in Manila, Philippines, were played out on the news worldwide on Monday, August 23, 2010.

Glued to the live updates on the hostage crisis were the 20 tourists' family members back in Hong Kong, and the hijacker, Rolando Mendoza, a former decorated policeman for 30 years, who was dismissed on charges of robbery and extortion two years ago.

After ten hours of having failed at negotiating with Mendoza and his demands, the policemen attempted storming the bus. They failed the first time, and were pushed back by fired shots. Unable to read the situation inside the bus, they resorted to using tear gas to force him out. Another hour and a half later, they finally succeeded in charging inside when Mendoza was shot dead by a sniper after the tear gas had made him move near the bus's broken door.

Inside the bus, eight hostages were found dead, all from Hong Kong, along with the dead hijacker. Three hostages were also seriously injured with one still in a coma and a bystander was hit by a stray bullet. [1]

A mixture of outrage and mourning brought an estimated 80,000 protesters marching in Hong Kong on Sunday, August 29th. The hijacked bus was carrying a Hong Kong tour group in Manila. Protesters demanded an explanation for the disappointing police response and handling of the hostage crisis from the Filipino police force. "Many people in Hong Kong believe the lives of the tourists taken hostage were not properly valued." [2] The incident has brought on an onset of questions towards handling of crises involving international hostages and what kind of police response is appropriate. A team from the Hong Kong police is currently conducting a thorough investigation along with local police in the Philippines.

Philippine officials admitted to faults in mishandling the bus hostage situation. [3] A major criticism of the incident was the live broadcast of the standoff worldwide, when the situation called for media blackout. A bystander was shot in the leg, proving that they had let the public, and the media, too close. The extensive coverage allowed Mendoza to follow police activity, robbing the police the element of surprise. It has also allowed the world media to analyze the actions by the Philippine police force in this incident.

One such authority, Charles Shoebridge, a security analyst who has worked in counter-terrorism with the British Army and Scotland Yard, has pointed out major areas of faults [4]:

The police force failed, even at the last hour, to board the bus. One of the survivors questioned “Why was there no one to help us after so many hours?" [5] Her husband had been killed trying to stop the gunman.

The siege was unnecessarily prolonged by lacking of correct equipment, not using special forces trained for such a situation, but local police who visibly lacked the equipment and the tactical training. The longer it took to bring down the gunman, the more danger the police and the hostages were in. The police had let opportunities to disarm and to shoot the hijacker slip, such as when he let his guard down when they were negotiating and when he was by himself. There is investigation to see if the police were soft on Mendoza, who was a former decorated and respected officer, their former superior.

Under such circumstances, no one expected the police to fulfill promises. By not satisfying the hijacker's request, which were to simply reinstate his job and clear his name, the police force hindered negotiations. Instead, they tried bringing in Mendoza’s brother to negotiate, and ended up further stressing Mendoza.

To further worsen the situation, it has been discovered that three of the victims' coffins were mixed up. Filipino authority Philippine Social Welfare Secretary Corazon Soliman claims that the mix up was only due to the rushed delivery of the coffins intending to return the victims to their families as quickly as possible. [6] Such a blunder only served to further strain Chinese-Filipino relations.

About 140,000 Hong Kong tourists visit the Philippines yearly and hundreds have canceled planned trips. [6] The story has already hurt Philippine tourism industry.

Concerns have also been raised about a possible backlash on the more than 100,000 Filipinos working in Hong Kong, mostly as domestic helpers. [7] There has been a history of abuse and discrimination against the undocumented workers. They must endure mean work conditions out of fear of being sent back home by their employers where they often face a heavy debt from the money they borrowed to get to Hong Kong.

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[1] Conde, Carlos H. “Gunman and 8 Hostages Dead in Philippine Tour Bus Standoff.” 23 August 2010. The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/24/world/asia/24phils.html

[2] Drew, Kevin. “Anger Remains Over Killings of Chinese Hostages in Philippines.” 27 August 2010. The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/28/world/asia/28hong.html

[3] Conde, Carlos H. "Officials admit failings in Manila Hostage Standoff." 24 August 2010. The New York Times.http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/25/world/asia/25phils.html

[4] “Ten things the Philippines bus siege police got wrong.” 24 August 2010. BBC World News.http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11069616

[5] "Philipines president pledges Manila Bus Siege inquiry." 23 August 2010. BBC World. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11066656

[6] “Manila to probe Hong Kong hostage coffin ‘mix up.” 2 September 2010. BBC World News.http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11161631

[7] Lee, Min. "Hong Kong Police Inspect Bus Hostage." 30 August 2010. CBS news.http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/08/29/ap/asia/main6816420.shtml

FSB to Enjoy More Powers in Russia

Many important changes have occurred in Russia since Vladimir Putin had been elected President. One of the most tangible changes was the strengthening of the Federal Security Agency (FSB), successor of the Soviet Union secret police, better known as KGB. Once an institution predominantly engaged in domestic affairs, under Putin the FSB became the main security service of the state with “the right to operate abroad, collect information, and carry out special operations” (Soldatov). Just mentioning the fact that the FSB’s budget is not published and the total number of officers is undisclosed gives you an idea of how much power this institution really enjoys (Soldatov). Although many believed that Medvedev as a professional lawyer would not continue Putin’s policy of strengthening the security services, to everybody’s surprise, this past July he signed off a bill granting the FSB more powers. In the opinion of numerous human rights activists in Russia and abroad this bill may dramatically increase FSB influence over Russian society.

A total of 354 deputies in the State Duma, the lower house of the Russian parliament, voted for the bill granting the FSB the right to issue “official warnings to individuals whose actions are deemed to be creating the conditions for crime”(“Russia Gives Powers”). Only 96 deputies were against. This is not surprising, taken into account that the majority of seats in the Russian Parliament are distributed between the ruling United Russia party headed by Prime Minister Putin and the ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic party (pro-Putin because it is the only way it can keep afloat). According to the Russian government, the new law is aimed at combating extremism and protecting the average Russian after Moscow's subway system had been hit by dual suicide bombers at the end of March. The problem is that the state’s definition of “extremism” has become quite broad in the past few years. Now it includes “slandering of a public official, hindering the work of authorities and involvement in hooliganism or vandalism for ideological, religious or ethnic reasons” (Golloher). So, pretty much any activity could be identified as extremist in Russia nowadays.

The new law expending FSB powers has raised many protests among oppositional and human rights groups in Russia. Rights activist Ludmilla Alexeeva, the head of the Moscow Helsinki Group, says that “the new law reminds her of a warning she received for her political activities in 1974, when KGB agents arrived at her place of work in a black car and immediately detained her” (Joselow). Some even say that "the new bill gives the FSB back the powers of special services of totalitarian regimes” (“Russian Parliament Enlarges”). Others believe the new law has an alternate purpose: “to stifle dissent and to scare political activists away from holding protests and rallies” (Joselow).

The anxiety of human rights groups is quite understandable. Thanks to unlimited rights and immunity from top government officials, the FSB managed to put in jail numerous people of political interest to the Kremlin, to include prominent scientists and oligarchs. One of the Kremlin’s most powerful political opponents, Mikhail Khodorkovsky - former CEO of the Russian oil company Yukos - is still in jail. Now with even more powers, the FSB could easily curtail the rights of government critics and the independent media - important components of a democratic state. Therefore, granting more rights to the FSB will move Russia even further from becoming a true democratic state – something Medvedev committed himself to at the very beginning of his presidential term.


Works cited

Joselow, Gabe. “Russian Opposition Sees Shadow of KGB in New Security Bill.” GlobalSecurity.org. 19 July 2010. 1 Sept. 2010 .

Golloher, Jessica. “Russia's Security Service Could Gain Powers Formerly Associated With Soviet KGB.” News.com English. 5 June 2010. 29 Aug. 2010 .

“Russia Gives Powers to FSB to prosecute 'thought crime.'” Telegraph. 29 July 2010, 1 Sept. 2010 .

Soldatov, Andrei and Irina Borogan. Foreign Affairs. Sept./Oct. 2010. Vol. 89, No 5. pp. 80-97.